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ARE PRIVATE PRISONS TO BLAME
FOR MASS INCARCERATION AND ITS EVILS?
PRISON CONDITIONS, NEOLIBERALISM, AND PUBLIC CHOICE
Hadar Aviram*
Abstract
One of the frequently criticized aspects of American mass
incarceration is privatized incarceration, which is frequently
considered worse by definition, than public incarceration, both for
philosophical-ethical reasons and because its for-profit structure
creates a disincentive to invest in improving prison conditions.
Relying on literature about the neoliberal state and on insights from
public choice economics, this Article sets out to challenge the
distinction between public and private incarceration, making two
main arguments: piecemeal privatization of functions, utilities and
services within state prisons make them operate more like private
facilities, and public actors respond to the cost/benefit pressures of
the market just like private ones. The paper illustrates these
arguments with several examples of correctional response to the
conditions caused by the Great Recession, showing public and private
actors alike adopting a cost-minimizing, financially prudent
approach, sometimes at the expense of prison conditions and inmate
human rights. The paper ends by suggesting that, in a neoliberal
capitalist environment, prohibitions and litigation alone cannot
improve prison conditions, and that policymakers need to consider
proper market incentives regulating both private and public prisons.
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ARE PRIVATE PRISONS TO BLAME
FOR MASS INCARCERATION AND ITS EVILS?
PRISON CONDITIONS, NEOLIBERALISM, AND PUBLIC CHOICE
They are telling this of Lord Beaverbrook and a visiting
Yankee actress. In a game of hypothetical questions,
Beaverbrook asked the lady: ‘Would you live with a stranger
if he paid you one million pounds?’ She said she would.
‘And if be paid you five pounds?’ The irate lady fumed:
‘Five pounds. What do you think I am?’ Beaverbrook
replied: ‘We’ve already established that. Now we are trying
to determine the degree.”1
INTRODUCTION
Anyone seeking a reason to rail against in the American correctional
system will find plenty of easy targets. With approximately 2.2
million people behind bars2--1 in 100 American citizens,3 and more in
certain states4--it is a frightening colossus of confinement and the
world leader in incarceration rates.5 Vastly more people are under
some form of correctional control—probation or parole—raising the
number of people supervised by the criminal justice system to 6.7
million.6 Between 1980 and 2012, the total number of state and local
prisoners in the United States rose from 501,886 to 2,228,400-- a

O. O. McIntyre, “As O. O. McIntyre Sees It,” The Muscatine Journal and NewsTribune 3, January 2, 1937. The anecdote has also been attributed to Bernard Shaw,
Winston Churchill, and several others.
2
The Sentencing Project, “Incarceration,” 2014,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107.
1

3

The Pew Charitable Trusts, “U.S. Prison Population Drops for Third Year
as States Adopt New Policy Strategies,” August 8, 2013,
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/pressreleases/2013/08/08/us-prison-population-drops-for-third-year-as-statesadopt-new-policy-strategies.
4

Ibid.

5

The Sentencing Project, “Incarceration.”

6

The Pew Charitable Trusts, “One in 31 U.S. Adults are Behind Bars, on Parole or
Probation,” 2014, http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/pressreleases/0001/01/01/one-in-31-us-adults-are-behind-bars-on-parole-or-probation.
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344% increase7—while the U.S. population grew in the same time
only from 226.5 million to 313 million—a 38% increase.8
Shockingly, these numbers are not justified by the need to control
crime, whose rates have been steadily declining since the 1980s.9
Scholars studying the connection found little causal connection
between the increase in incarceration and the decrease in crime,
attributing only 10% of the decline, at most, to incarceration. The
conditions of incarceration, while diverse across the nation, are so
appalling that many state prisons and county jails are under some
form of federal court supervision.10 Most recently, the Supreme Court
found the physical and mental health care in California prisons
appalling—one inmate dying needlessly from iatrogenic causes every
six days11—indeed, so appalling that they could not be improved
without considerable population reduction.12 Eighty thousand inmates
are housed under conditions of solitary confinement,13 in tiny cells
7

This calculation includes 319,598 prison and 182,288 jail inmates in 1980,
and 1,483,900 prison and 744,500 jail inmates in 2012. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, “Total U.S. Correctional Population Declined in 2012 for Fourth
Year,” 2013, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/cpus12pr.cfm. During
the same time, the federal prison population grew from 25,000 to 219,000
inmates. Nathan James, “The Federal Prison Population Buildup: Overview,
Policy Changes, Issues, and Options,” Congressional Research Service,
2014, 2, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf. Notably, however, the
prison population began do decline in 2009, the year after the Great
Recession, and has continued to steadily decline since then.
8

The Sentencing Project, “Trends in U.S. Corrections,” 2013,
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_F
act_sheet.pdf. U.S. Census, “History: 1980 Fast Facts,”
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1980
_new.html. The population currently is approximately 320 million: U.S.
Census, “Population Clock,” 2014, http://www.census.gov/popclock/.
9

Franklin E. Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
10

Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the
Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
11

Brown v. Plata 131 U.S. 1910 (2011); Jonathan Simon, Mass
Incarceration on Trial: A Remarkable Court Decision and the Future of
Prisons in America (New York: The New Press, 2014).
12

Brown v. Plata 131 U.S. 1910.

13

Joseph Stromberg, “Research tells us that isolation is an ineffective
rehabilitation strategy and leaves lasting psychological damage,”
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with no outside stimulus,14 suffering abundant forms of neglect15 and
deteriorating mental health.16 The United States is one of the only
Western industrialized democracy in which the death penalty is alive
and well, retained in 32 of its states.17 At least a quarter of the United
States prison population consists of nonviolent drug offenders serving
lengthy sentences,18 while the legacy of the War on Drugs continues
to fuel horrifying violence domestically19 and in Mexico.20
Smithsonian, February 19, 2014, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/sciencenature/science-solitary-confinement-180949793/?no-ist.
14

Robert M. Ferrier, “An Atypical and Significant Hardship: The Supermax
Confinement of Death Row Prisoners Based Purely on Status - A Plea for
Procedural Due Process,” Arizona Law Review 46 (2004): 291-315,
http://www.arizonalawreview.org/pdf/46-2/46arizlrev291.pdf.
15

Terry A. Kupers, “What To Do With the Survivors? Coping With the
Long-Term Effects of Isolated Confinement,” Criminal Justice and
Behavior 35 (2008) 1005-1016; Josiah D. Rich, Sarah E. Wakeman, and
Samuel L. Dickman, “Medicine and the Epidemic of Incarceration in the
United States,” New England Journal of Medicine 364 (2011): 2081-2083.
16

Craig Haney, “A Culture of Harm: Taming the Dynamics of Cruelty in
Supermax Prisons,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 35 (2008): 956-984,
https://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/stop-solitary-mental-health-resources;
Terry A. Kupers, MD, MSP, “How to Create Madness in Prison,” in
Humane Prisons, ed. David Jones (Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing, 2006),
http://www.minutesbeforesix.com/MB6Files/2011/Kupers%20Humane%20
Prisons.pdf.
17

Max Fisher, “Map: Which Countries Use the Death Penalty?” The Atlantic, July 6,
2011,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/mapwhich-countries-use-the-death-penalty/241490/; Death Penalty
Information Center, “States With and Without the Death Penalty, 2014,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty.
18

Justice Policy Institute, “Substance Abuse Treatment and Public Safety,” January
2008, 1, http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08_01_REP_DrugTx_ACPS.pdf; Common Sense for Drug Policy, “Drug Offenders in the Correctional
System,” 2014,
http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Prisons_and_Drugs#sthash.WHjtG9jD.dpuf; E.
Ann Carson and Daniela Golinelli, “Prisoners in 2012: Trends in Admissions and
Releases, 1991-2012” Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, December
2013, NCJ243920, Table 5, p. 3, and Appendix Table 10, p. 43.
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf.
19

Meredith May, “Many young black men in Oakland are killing and dying
for respect,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 9, 2007,
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Many-young-black-men-in-Oaklandare-killing-and-3299781.php.
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Much academic and popular literature on American incarceration
frames its critique of this phenomenon in the context of what has
come to be known as the prison industrial complex.21 Indeed, the term
returns approximately 552,000 results in a Google search.22 Here are
some definitions of the PIC provided by advocacy sites:
a term we use to describe the overlapping interests of government
and industry that use surveillance, policing, and imprisonment as
solutions to economic, social and political problems. . . [power
over inmates] is also maintained by earning huge profits for
private companies that deal with prisons and police forces;
helping earn political gains for “tough on crime” politicians;
increasing the influence of prison guard and police unions; and
eliminating social and political dissent by oppressed communities
that make demands for self-determination and reorganization of
power in the US.23
a set of bureaucratic, political, and economic interests that
encourage increased spending on imprisonment, regardless of the
actual need. The prison-industrial complex is not a conspiracy,
guiding the nation's criminal-justice policy behind closed doors. It
is a confluence of special interests that has given prison
construction in the United States a seemingly unstoppable
momentum. It is composed of politicians, both liberal and
conservative, who have used the fear of crime to gain votes;
impoverished rural areas where prisons have become a
cornerstone of economic development; private companies that
regard the roughly $35 billion spent each year on corrections not
as a burden on American taxpayers but as a lucrative market; and
government officials whose fiefdoms have expanded along with
the inmate population. 24
20

Ioan Grillo, El Narco (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011).

21

Henceforth, “PIC”.

22

Accessed Aug. 26, 2014.

23

Critical Resistance, “What Is the PIC? What Is Abolition?” 2014,
http://criticalresistance.org/about/not-so-common-language/.
24

Eric Schlosser, “The Prison-Industrial Complex,” The Atlantic, December 1, 1998,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-prisonindustrial-complex/304669/.
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an interweaving of private business and government interests. Its
twofold purpose is profit and social control. Its public rationale is
the fight against crime.25
Eric Schlosser points out that “Private prisons are the most obvious,
controversial, and fastest-growing segment of the PIC”26 and, indeed,
these broad definitions frequently mention private prison companies
as the most salient example of the its harms. In an eponymous piece
from 1998, Angela Davis writes:
Prison privatization is the most obvious instance of capital’s
current movement toward the prison industry. While governmentrun prisons are often in gross violation of international human
rights standards, private prisons are even less accountable. In
March of this year, the Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA), the largest U.S. private prison company, claimed 54,944
beds in 68 facilities under contract or development in the U.S.,
Puerto Rico, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Following the
global trend of subjecting more women to public punishment,
CCA recently opened a women’s prison outside Melbourne. The
company recently identified California as its “new frontier.”27
Indeed, critical prison literature commonly takes on private prison
companies, assuming that private incarceration is, by definition,
worse than public incarceration, both for philosophical-ethical
reasons and because its for-profit structure creates a disincentive to
invest in improving prison conditions. These concerns are reasonable
and understandable. The concept of private enterprises designed to
directly benefit from human confinement and misery is profoundly
unethical and problematic. But while I share the critics’ concerns with
private prisons, I think that focusing on private prison companies as
25

Eve Goldberg and Linda Evans, “The Prison-Industrial Complex and the
Global Economy,” Global Research, October 18, 2001,
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/EVA110AA.html.
26

Schlosser, “The Prison-Industrial Complex.”

27

Angela Davis, “Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial
Complex,” Colorlines, September 10, 1998,
http://colorlines.com/archives/1998/09/masked_racism_reflections_on_the_
prison_industrial_complex.html.
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the source—or even the salient representation—of all evil in
American incarceration is misguided and myopic.
My concern with the critical movement’s focus on private
incarceration does not stem from wide-eyed belief in an unregulated,
free market’s ability to do well by doing good. Quite the contrary: an
unregulated correctional market is a sure recipe for the indifference
and cruelty we see in America’s prisons every day. However, the
focus on private actors as the bogeymen of American incarceration
belies a naïve understanding of neoliberal politics and a gross
underestimation of the extent to which everyone—private and public
actors alike—respond to market pressures and conduct their business,
including correctional business, through a cost/benefit prism. As this
Article argues, the profit incentives that brought private incarceration
into existence, rather than private incarceration itself, are to blame for
the PIC and its evils, and these evils cannot be remedied in full
without carefully structuring incentives for correctional agencies and
institutions that prioritize the goals we want to see manifested in the
world, namely, recidivism reduction and humane confinement
conditions.
The Article relies on two main bodies of literature from opposing
political and economic perspectives: the progressive and radical
literature on neoliberalism and the libertarian literature on public
choice economics. The literature on neoliberalism describes the
retreat of the state from its welfarist responsibilities and the
emergence of a disturbingly unmitigated form of capitalism. Public
choice literature exposes the ways in which public actors—
legislatures, judges, politicians and other government agencies and
individuals—conduct their affairs under the same microeconomic
principles that have traditionally been used to analyze the behavior of
private corporations and businesses. While public choice economists
often write from a libertarian standpoint,28 celebrating the retreat of
the state and the power of the free market, one need not accept their
ideological premises to see the realism in their analysis. That public
actors, like private ones, seek to increase benefits and avoid costs and
have no incentive to improve incarceration conditions does not mean
that such incentives cannot, or should not, be created.
28

Herbert Gintis, “Beyond Homo economicus: evidence from experimental
economics,” Ecological Economics 35 (2000): 311–322,
http://tbauler.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/48548115/gintis_homo%2520econo
micus.pdf.
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The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the classic ethical
and utilitarian arguments against prison privatization, relying on a
recent, much-publicized decision of the Israeli High Court of Justice,
which refused to allow the functioning of private prisons in Israel. It
then proceeds to provide theoretical background on the two bodies of
literature that guide my analysis: critiques of the neoliberal state and
public choice economics.
Part II proceeds to question the premise that private prisons are to be
blamed for a substantial part of the American incarceration crisis. As
this part argues, focusing on private prisons gives them, at the same
time, too much and too little weight. Too much—because the share of
private prisons in the overall incarceration project is fairly small, and
quantitative analysis fails to attribute prison growth to private prison
growth; and too little—because focusing on private prison companies
misses the fact that public correctional institutions are also,
essentially, privatized, in terms of most of their internal functions.
Part III turns to public actors in the criminal justice system and sets
out to demonstrate how, against a backdrop of neoliberal politics,
they behave remarkably like private prison companies. This part
highlights three aspects of the similarities: scandals emerging from
individual actors’ pursuit of profit at the expense of inmates, systemic
neglect and abuse stemming from cost/benefit analysis, and the
complicated relationship between public and private actors in the
aftermath of the Great Recession. This last aspect shows states and
private prison companies negotiating, wheeling and dealing, closing
and repurposing prisoners, importing and exporting them across state
lines, as techniques to cope with the impact of the Great Recession on
the American correctional landscape.
The conclusions of this analysis are not all grim. It is possible to
create conditions that incentivize prisons, both public and private, to
improve incarceration conditions and to implement programs that
promote rehabilitation, reentry, and recidivism reduction. The paper
therefore ends by offering some suggestions as to the main
characteristics of such an incentive system and explains why it would
be superior to any effort to prohibitively regulate private prisons.

9

I.

MAPPING AND QUESTIONING THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS ON
PRIVATE INCARCERATION
A. The Ethical Argument

In 2000, the Israeli High Court of Justice was petitioned to rule a new
amendment to the Prison Ordinance unconstitutional.29 The
amendment in question allowed a private prison entrepreneur to
operate a private prison in Israel. The petition, on behalf of civil rights
organizations as well as potential inmates in the new prison,30
presented various reasons for the amendment’s unconstitutionality.
While the petitioning civil rights organization focused on the ethical
problem inherent in the privatization of punishment,31 the comments
on behalf of the potential inmates pertained to the concerns that
privatizing the industry will lead to a decrease in minimal prison
conditions.32
While Israel lacks a formal constitution, it has a series of “basic laws”
of constitutional nature, adopted by a supermajority of lawmakers.
One such law is Basic Law: Human Liberty and Dignity,33 among
whose tenets are the right to life and dignity,34 personal freedom,35
29

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 1391 of
the 20th Adar Bet, 5752, 1992) (Isr.), translated at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. No real
constitution: “basic laws” but they have constitutional power, particularly
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. As per the quasi-constitutional
construct in this Basic Law, any violation of the rights provided in it,
including Section 5, which disallows a “deprivation of restriction of the
liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or otherwise” unless
it is made (1) by law (2) “befitting the values of the State of Israel”, (3)
“enacted for a proper purpose”, and (4) “to an extent no greater than is
required.”
30

Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance (2009) HCJ
2605/05 (Isr.), translated at
http://www.privateci.org/private_pics/Israel_Ruling.pdf.
31

Id. at 36-37.

32

Id.

33

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

34

Id. at section 2.

35

Id. at section 5.
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and privacy.36 Any infringement upon these rights must be done “by
law that befits the values of the State of Israel, for an appropriate
purpose, and not greater than necessary”.37 Accordingly, the Court set
out to examine the purpose and the extent to which human rights are
infringed by the law allowing prison privatization.
Despite the fact that petitioners invited the Court to examine not only
ethical arguments, but also the actual impact privatization might have
on incarceration conditions, the Court chose to focus on the former.
Chief Justice Beinicsh argued that economic profit motives are not the
ones that the law would deem an “appropriate purpose” of deprivation
of rights,38 and that any extent to which people’s freedom is restricted
for this purpose is “greater than necessary.”39 The concurring
opinions also found that the law came up short of fulfilling the
constitutional requirements. Justice Procaccia’s concurrence found
that the purpose might be improving prison conditions by relieving
prison overcrowding.40 While this, deemed Justice Procaccia, was an
“appropriate purpose”, it could be achieved via means other than
prison privatization.41 Justice Naor’s concurring opinion also argued
that the law is unequal in creating discrimination between public and
private inmates,42 as well as problematic in allowing prison providers
to profit from inmate labor.43
The sole dissenter, Justice Levy, argued that without empirical data
on the function and conditions of private prisons, determining its
impact on individual rights and freedoms was impossible.44

36
37

Id. at section 7.
Id. at section 8.

38

Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance, HCJ
2605/05 at 105.
39

Id. at 58.

40

Id. at 130-131.

41

Id. at 130-132.

42

Id. at 161-162.

43

Id. at 163-166.

44

Id. at 188-189.
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The decision was widely lauded as progressive and revolutionary
among journalists45 and activists,46 and several academics expressed
philosophical critiques of private incarceration. Yoav Peled and
Doron Navot47, as well as Avihay Dorfman and Alon Harel,48 have
argued that some governmental decisions simply cannot be executed
by private entities. Incarceration, as an expression of the public
response to criminal behavior, is one such function, as it is an
expression of the public will to punish, and as such could not be
privatized.49
Similar ethical critiques of incarceration are offered beyond the
context of the Israeli decision. Michael Reisig and Travis Pratt50 rely
on Weber’s state rationality theory to point out that, because criminal
punishment is administered in response to violations of the laws of the
state, it is inherently related to the state’s power. They add that the
pervasiveness of punishment in America makes the coercion involved
in it even more closely tied to the state.51 This perspective stems
directly from Enlightenment-era liberal theories of the state, none of
which offered a basis for delegating what, by nature, is the state’s
response to a violation of its rules.52 Moreover, even from the
perspective of libertarian philosophies, individuals do not have the

45

Editorial: Canceling Prison Privatization: A Revolutionary Liberal
Decision, Haaretz, Nov. 20, 2009, available at:
http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/1.1291075
46

Einat Gal and Na’ama Carmi, Crime and Punishment: Privatizing
Prisons—Position Paper, Physicians for Human Rights, available at:
http://www.phr.org.il/uploaded/26%20novb04.doc.pdf
47

Yoav Peled and Doron Navot, “Private Incarceration - Towards a
Philosophical Critique,” Constellations 19 (2012): 216-234,
http://philpapers.org/rec/PELPI.
48

Avihay Dorfman and Alon Harel, “The Case Against Privatization,”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 41 (2013): 67-102,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103365.
49

Ibid., 72.

50

Michael D. Reisig and Travis C. Pratt, “The Ethics of Correctional
Privatization: A Critical Examination of the Delegation of Coercive
Authority,” The Prison Journal 80 (2000): 210-222.
51

Ibid., 212.

52

Ibid., 215.
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right to harm each other; the necessity to do so has been delegated to
the state.53
Some ethical support for this position can be found in Norbert Elias’
classical work The Civilizing Process.54 Relying on an abundance of
historical documentation, Elias argues that the formation of the Early
Modern states was characterized by a sublimation of what gradually
came to be regarded as base and violent urges. Blood lust was tamed;
more refined table manners started to appear; and some bodily
functions that were conducted in public were relegated to the private
realm. Social historians relying on Elias’ analysis, such as V.A.C.
Gatrell,55 Pieter Spierenburg56 and Robert Nye,57 have also associated
the decline in disorganized violence between individuals to the
increasing power of the state. Duels, for example, emerged to control
and codify violence within acceptable boundaries of honor and
regulation; gradually, as the state took over punishment, such forms
of individual-on-individual recourse have disappeared. These sociohistorical works are, in a way, an illustration of Thomas Hobbes’
Leviathan:58 the process by which people give their power of
aggression to the emerging modern state.
In the American context, there are other issues that make privatization
disturbing from an ethical perspective. As Michelle Alexander argues
in The New Jim Crow,59 there is a direct linkage between the
53

Ibid., 217.

54

Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994).

55

V.A.C. Gatrell, “The Decline of Theft and Violence in Victorian and
Edwardian England” in Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in
Western Europe since 1500, ed. V.A.C. Gatrell, Bruce Lenman and
Geoffrey Parker (London: Europa Publications, 1980), 238-365.
56

Pieter Spierenburg, “The Spectacle of Suffering,” in Men and Violence:
Gender, Honor and Rituals in Modern Europe and America, ed. Pieter
Spierenburg (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 1998), 103127.
57

Robert Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
58

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

59

Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age
of Colorblindness (New York: The New Press, 2012).
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abolition of slavery and the exclusion of inmates from the clause
forbidding forced labor. Indeed, in the decades following the abolition
of slavery, prison population, which during the civil war was largely
white, gradually shifted to overrepresent inmates of color and subject
them to forced work practices not dissimilar to antebellum practices.
Moreover, during the nadir of race relations, private chain gangs
proliferated, disturbingly resembling the private profit involved in
slave labor a few decades earlier.60 This disturbing heritage evokes
considerable discomfort with the idea of profiting from human
suffering which, in a different form, was a blight that still casts a dark
shadow on race relations in the United States.
B. The Incentive Argument: For-Profit Incentives in the
Neoliberal State Lead to Worsened Conditions
The second argument frequently made against prison privatization
addresses the problematic incentives resulting from allowing
incarceration for profit. This argument is deeply rooted in critical
analysis of the neoliberal state.
The term “neoliberalism” was originally coined in 1938 to describe
fairly moderate economic policies, consisting of a free market with
competition but supported by a strong and impartial state.61 Even after
the usage of the term declined in the 196os, moderate Democrats such
as Clinton and Gore used it to describe their political ideology as late
as the 1980s.62 The current common usage of the term emerged in
Chile, where it was used by left-wing oppositionists to describe the
free market regime advocated by Pinochet and his hired economic
advisors, who were Chicago-school libertarian economists.63 Since
60

Alex Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of
Convict Labor in the New South (Brooklyn: Verso, 1996).
61

Philip Mirowsk and Dieter Plehwe, The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of
the Neoliberal Thought Collective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2009).
62

David Brooks, “The Vanishing Neoliberal,” New York Times, March 11,
2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/opinion/11brooks.html?_r=1&amp.
63

Taylor C. Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse, “Neoliberalism: From New Liberal
Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan,” Studies in Comparative International
Development 44 (2009): 137-161, 149, http://people.bu.edu/tboas/neoliberalism.pdf.
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then, “neoliberalism” is usually taken to mean broad support for a
capitalist, free-market economy, and for a reduction in the regulatory
power of the state. Neoliberalism usually advocates free competition
and privatization, as well as the removal of external controls of the
market such as tariffs, standards, and restrictions on capital flows and
investment. With this ideology comes a call for a reduction in state
expenditures on social services, such as health and education, and a
shift in emphasis from communitarianism and interdependence to
individual achievement and responsibility.64 The assumption
underlying neoliberal ideology is that, if the government and the legal
system refrain from intervening in free market activities, the balance
created by supply and demand leads to a healthy equilibrium that
happens on its own, invoking the “invisible hand” of the market—a
term coined in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.65
Several commentators have observed that the state’s retreat from its
welfare and social functions is often accompanied by greater
oppression of the lower rungs of society, who are most likely to find
themselves criminalized. In Disciplining the Poor,66 Joe Soss, Richard
Fording and Sanford Schram argue that current policies addressing
poverty governance are the result of a combination of two ideologies:
neoliberalism, consisting of a retreat from welfare reform and a lack
of commitment to combat property, and paternalism, focused on
infantilizing the poor and dictating their courses of action. Similarly,
in Punishing the Poor,67 Loïc Wacquant ties the increase in
incarceration in the United States to the turn in American economics.
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According to Wacquant, punishment rates rose not because of fear of
crime, but because of social insecurities brought about by the
undermining of the class and race hierarchies. As a result, the state
has created a link between “workfare” and “prisonfare”, penalizing
property, expecting individual responsibility despite systemic class
differences and differences in opportunities. Ironically, to Wacquant,
the economic deregulation and retreat of the state from its welfarist
function led to an increase in its punitive function, “managing” its
poor through criminalization and incarceration, rather than providing
them with opportunities for labor and mobilization.
These ideologies, argue privatization opponents, play out in a
particularly destructive form in the context of prison privatization.
First, they make private incarcerating companies complicit in
overcrowding and mass incarceration. Private prison companies, it is
argued, are compensated on a per-diem basis: the state pays the
company a price per-inmate-per-bed-per-day. Since a certain number
of inmates is necessary to make the operation profitable, contracts
between states and private companies often specify the occupancy
rate the state is obligated to supply. In that form, prison population
and incarceration become a function not of crime rates and public
safety, but of supply and demand and contractual obligation.
Moreover, unregulated private correctional institutions, whose
primary motive is profit, are incentivized to seek it at all costs, and
with a lack of a strong state regulatory power over their operations,
are likely to skimp and save on costly goods, services, and programs.
As a result, there are serious concerns that conditions in private
prisons will be worse, since unregulated private enterprises will
maximize their profit—and their bloated executive pay—at the
expense of the inmates. The state finds private greed difficult to
regulate, because citizens repeatedly vote down bond issues that fund
prison expansion while at the same time demanding increases in
incarceration.68
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Finally, a business model tends to expand and encompass new fields;
in search of new profit, private prison companies seek new markets,
such as the undocumented detention market. As David Sklansky
found,69
“crimmigration”—the
criminal
management
of
immigration—has increased as a response to market conditions, and
not merely as a response to concerns about terrorism.
C. The Efficiency Argument: Public Choice and Its Critics
A third set of arguments on privatization addresses the extent to
which it is more profitable for the state, as a whole, to run its
institutions by delegating them to private hands. These arguments
come from public choice theory, which is best defined as the
application of economic theory to the field of politics and
government.70 There is considerable diversity in public choice
literature: some writings accept some premises of microeconomics
without dispute, such as the assumptions of perfect rationality and
perfect information, and some dispute them and bring empirical
considerations into the analysis; some accept the premise that there is
social consensus about the “common good” and some assume that
there will be competing concepts of the “common good” among
citizens and institutions.71
However, one characteristic quality of public choice literature is deep
skepticism about the typical distinction between the private and public
realms of law and of society.72 Public choice scholars analyze the
legislative process, judicial decisionmaking, administrative
regulation, and more, using the same cost-benefit tools traditionally
69
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relegated to the study of private markets. From this standpoint, public
choice often critiques the state for undue interference in the
operations of the market; it perceives “big government” intervention
as undemocratic in the sense that it immunizes itself, and the
industries it regulates, from being open to market considerations.73
This is not merely a democratic critique: public choice economists
believe in the positive contribution of market-driven competition to
policy development.74
In the specific context of prison privatization, public choice
economists usually support private enterprises, arguing that a
competitive marketplace in any field—including incarceration—
motivates efficiency.75 The sensitivity to market fluctuations means
that private companies can be flexible in response to correctional
needs.76 As one proponent argues, competition begets creativity: “[A]
contract to run a government program—say, a prison—only specifies
a basic service, but the agent can invest in thinking up various
innovations to the service. Some cut costs, some improve quality.
Appropriate some of the net benefit by renegotiating the contract.
Incentives are suboptimal, but at least better than those of public
managers, who have a more precarious bargaining position.”77
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Moreover, at least in the 1980s, the increase in demand for
incarceration simply could not be matched solely by the public
sector;78 population reduction orders can only provide a temporary
relief for overcrowding, and more institutions are needed in the long
run.79 The funding structure for private institutions, primarily via
lease-revenue bonds, meant that they could be built fairly quickly,
without being clogged in budgetary bureaucracy difficulties.80 Finally,
the different nature of private prison firms and public sector
correctional employee unions means different abilities and incentives
to lobby for greater incarceration.81Privatization, by nature, fragments
the market, which means private firms may have less power and
incentive to lobby for more incarceration.82 By contrast, in places
where correctional employee unions have been allowed to gain
considerable political power, they have been powerful players in the
state correctional policies.83
But not everyone agrees that prison privatization is necessarily more
efficient than public incarceration. Some critics of the libertarian
position argue that any savings on private institutions will necessarily
the State, ed. D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas Cheng, and Ioannis Lianos (Palo Alto, CA:
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be only for the short term, because the per-diem compensation
scheme requires that prison occupancy be maintained.84 Moreover,
some questions are raised regarding the ability of a private industry to
employ the kind of economy of scale that would yield significant
savings.85
This raises the question whether, indeed, private prisons are more
efficient than public ones. There are several important considerations
that make such efficiency comparisons difficult. First, private prison
critics argue that the private prison companies tend to omit some of
their costs, such as salaries, from the operational costs of the facilities.
And second, any comparative analysis has to take into account that
private prisons are typically newer, and as such have to incur less
maintenance costs than older institutions.86 Nonetheless, there are a
few dozen studies comparing private and public institutions—enough
to obtain a general picture.
In a 1999 study,87 Travis Pratt and Jeff Maahs conducted a metaanalysis that encompassed 33 such evaluations of private and public
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facilities from 24 independent studies of adult male prisons.88 In
comparing the efficiency of these institutions, they controlled for
differences in institutional characteristics across independent studies,
such as the size of the facility (economy of scale), the security level,
and the age of the facility.89 The dependent variable was the effectsize estimate: the daily per-diem cost of operating the facility.90 The
study found that ownership of the institution, in itself, was an
insignificant predictor of the standardized measure of inmate cost per
day. Other institutional characteristics much more significant: the
inmate population size and the age of the institution, and the security
level of the facility.91 In general, for maximum security institutions,
private institutions did better,whereas in minimum and medium
security institutions, private facilities fared slightly better. 367 A
newer meta-analysis by Brad Lundahl, et al.,92 also found no
significant difference in costs and savings between private and public
institutions. Lundahl, et al. also found that the competitive market did
not create any improvements in terms of quality of confinement,
which did not considerably between private and public prisons; public
prisons fared slightly better in terms of the skill trainings they offered
to inmates and had slightly fewer inmate grievances.
Our next step will be to challenge the classic arguments against
privatization in light of public choice and neoliberal skepticism of the
public/private divide.
II. QUESTIONING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE
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A. Private Prisons’ Share in Mass Incarceration
The political and scholarly energy invested in debating the merits and
shortcomings of private incarceration beg the question whether
private prisons are the cause of the massive increase in incarceration
since the late 1970s. Progressive advocacy materials tend to highlight
the power and growth of private prison companies like the
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the GEO Group.
Commenting on the Rutherford Institute website, John Whitehead
highlights the bottom line as a “$70 billion gold mine”, and mentions
CCA’s recent proposal to prison officials in 48 states to buy and
manage public prisons at a substantial cost savings to the states—
provided that these prisons contain at least 1,000 beds and states
maintain a 90% occupancy rate in the privately run prisons for at least
20 years.93
Similarly, the ACLU report on mass incarceration bemoans its
increase “exponential growth”,94 pointing out that “as mass
incarceration led to disastrous effects for the nation as a whole, one
special interest group—the private prison industry—emerged as a
clear winner. A massive transfer of taxpayer dollars to the private
prison industry accompanied the unprecedented increase in
incarceration and the rapid ascent of for-profit imprisonment.”95
“Accompanied,” however, does not necessarily equal “caused”, but in
many publications this distinction remains blurry. This is particularly
the case in writings examining the connection between racial
stratification and the prison industrial complex,96 as well as in a report
93

John W. Whitehead, “Jailing Americans for Profit: The Rise of the Prison
Industrial Complex,” The Rutherford Institute, April 10, 2012,
https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/john_whiteheads_com%
20mentary/jailing_americans_for_profit_the_rise_of_the_prison_industrial_
complex
94

ACLU, “Banking on Bondage: Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration,”
November 2, 2011,
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf, 10.
95

Ibid., 12.

96

Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow

22

by the Progressive Labor Party, which accuses the prison industry of
being “an imitation of Nazi Germany with respect to forced slave
labor and concentration camps.”97A causal explanation can, of course,
be provided. Joel Dyer’s The Perpetual Prison Machine98 argues that
the increase in prison population is a function of three components:
the consolidation of large media corporations that sensationalize
crime and violence content, the increasing use of public opinion
polling by politicians who wish to pander to “popular” views about
crime, and the collaboration between the state and private
corporations, who allow governments to expand incarceration without
the initial expenditure for construction. As Julia Sadbury argues, “the
mutually profitable relationship between private corporations and
public criminal justice systems enables politicians to mask the
enormous cost of their tough-on- crime policies by sidestepping the
usual process of asking the electorate to vote for 'prison bonds' to
raise funds to build publicly operated prisons. Instead, they can
simply reallocate revenue funds from welfare, health or education into
contracts with privately run-for-profit prisons. Since the 1980s, the
private sector has allowed prison building to continue, even where
public coffers have been exhausted by the prison construction boom.
It has been rewarded with cheap land, tax breaks and discounts in
sewage and utilities charges, making prison companies a major
beneficiary of corporate welfare. These three components constitute
the 'political and economic chain reaction' that we have come to know
as the prison industrial complex: a symbiotic and profitable
relationship between politicians, corporations, the media and state
correctional institutions that generates the racialized use of
incarceration as a response to social problems rooted in the
globalization of capital.”99

97

Vicky Pelaez, “The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a New
Form of Slavery?” Global Research, March 31, 2014,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-united-states- big-businessor-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289.
98

Joel Dyer, The Perpetual Prisoner Machine (New York: Basic Books,
2000).
99

Julia Sadbury, “Celling Black Bodies: Black Women in the Global Prison
Industrial Complex,” Feminist Review 70 (2002): 57-74,
http://jthomasniu.org/class/687/Readings/women-global.pdf.

23

There are very good reasons to be concerned about the effects of
punitive policies of communities of color, though a nuanced approach
to the racialized aspects of prison would not ignore the spread of
incarceration of white inmates in the heartland,100 nor would it
cheapen dilute the horrors of the “old Jim Crow” by drawing blanket
comparisons between the two regimes.101 Still, this popularized form
of accusing private prison companies in part for the ills of the prison
system is so common that it has been adopted, unquestioningly, by the
National Research Council (NRC) in its recently published report on
the reasons for mass incarceration,102 assuming that readers will
accept it as given:
By the mid-1990s, the new economic interests—including private
prison companies, prison guards’ unions, and the suppliers of
everything from bonds for new prison construction to Taser stun
guns—were playing an important role in maintaining and
sustaining the incarceration increase. The influence of economic
interests that profit from high rates of incarceration grew at all
levels of government, due in part to a “revolving door” that
emerged between the corrections industry and the public sector.
Another factor was the establishment of powerful, effective, and
well-funded lobbying groups to represent the interests of the
growing corrections sector. The private prison industry and other
companies that benefit from large prison populations have
expended substantial effort and resources in lobbying for more
punitive laws and for fewer restrictions on the use of prison labor
and private prisons . . . Many legislators and other public
officials, especially in economically struggling rural areas,
became strong advocates of prison and jail construction in the
1990s, seeing it as an important engine for economic
development. The evidence suggests, however, that prisons
100

Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass
Incarceration in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
101
James Forman, Jr., “Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim
Crow,” New York University Law Review 87 (2012): 101-146,
http://racism.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1119:ra
cial-critiques2012&catid=137&Itemid=155&showall=1&limitstart=.
102

Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western, and Steve Redburn, The Growth of Incarceration
in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences (Washington, DC: The
National Academies Press, 2014),
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18613.

24

generally have an insignificant, or sometimes negative, impact on
the economic development of the rural communities where they
are located.103
The report cites numerous popular sources, with Ruth Gilmore’s
Golden Gulag104 and Heather Ann Thompson’s Why Mass
Incarceration Matters105 as its only refereed academic sources. The
evils of private incarceration and the pervasive incentives
notwithstanding, it is important to keep in mind the share of private
incarceration in the overall correctional market. As of 2010, only 8
percent of prisoners were housed in a private prison, about 7 percent
in state systems, and about 16 percent in the federal system. Of the 30
states that contracted out, the median percentage of inmates in private
prisons was about 10 percent, and no state’s percentage exceeded 45
percent.106 The outcome is a concentrated, but not monopolistic,
prison industry.107
In his critique of the NRC report,108 John Pfaff points out more
problems with the theory that privatization was a main contributor to
mass incarceration. Not only does the private prison industry house
relatively low rates of inmates, it cannot in itself be accountable for
even that percentage of the incarceration market. While, according to
a Justice Policy Institute report109, the industry has donated over $6
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million to state races in the last five election cycles, Pfaff argues,
based on the Institute’s same source, that these donations need to be
considered in the larger context of state lobbying and spending. The
funds provided by private companies, says Pfaff, are vastly
outnumbered by the donations of public and non-profit lobbyists such
as the educational lobby, and total political spending ran $14.5 billion,
a much vaster sum than the private prison lobby’s contribution to
political races.110
While Pfaff’s analysis ignores the fact that private prison companies
may choose to spend specifically on bills that push mass
incarceration,111 his conclusions about the percentage of private
institutions among all U.S. incarceration should give pause to popular
proponents of the prison industrial complex theories. Using BJS data,
Pfaff charts the state’s rate of incarceration growth between 2000 and
2008 as a function of the percent of each state’s prisoners that are held
in private facilities.112 He finds no connection between percent of
private inmates and prison growth.
Fig. 1. Private Prisons and Prison Growth, 2000-2008
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Pfaff’s chart raises a few difficult questions, however. The data
depicts prison growth in privatized institutions, but ignores the fact
that many of the inmates housed in Arizona, Oklahoma, Florida and
Texas are out-of-state inmates imported to those states, and it is
unclear whether his prison growth data attributes the numbers of those
prisoners to their state of origin or to the incarcerating state. This is
particularly notable in states like Hawaii, which incarcerates close to
30% of its inmates on the mainland, in private facilities.113
Despite these shortcomings and difficulties, Pfaff’s conclusion that it
is inaccurate to blame mass incarceration on the privatization of
prisons seems fairly sound. However, the conventional PIC
explanations are not only too cruel to privatization; they are too kind
to it, in that they focus on CCA and GEO as the be-all, end-all of
incarceration. Privatization mentality is much more pervasive and
intrusive, to the point that it is no longer easy, or sensible, to draw
firm distinctions between private and public prisons.
B. Even Public Prisons are Privatized
113
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The aforementioned decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice was
very adamant in its ethical condemnation of private prisons. However,
it explicitly noted that the unconstitutionality of the amendment does
not rule out any privatization of prison services within a public prison,
such as construction, laundry, feeding, and other services.114
In her critique of the Israeli decision,115 Hila Shamir argues that the
opinion represents an antiquated and unsophisticated perception of the
market, which unduly distinguishes between the state and the market,
creating an unhealthy dichotomy between public and private actors.116
Similarly, Malcolm Feeley has criticized the decision based on
empirical work conducted in Australian private institutions.117 Feeley
argues that the condemnation of privatization as an expression of
modernity is ahistorical and ignores multiple, and accepted, historical
examples of private criminal justice.118Moreover, while Shamir
argues that the concept of the state as separate from the market is
unsophisticated, Feeley argues that the concept of the state itself is
flawed – the decision perceives the state as a Leviathan,119 rather than
the disaggregated group of different actors and sectors.120
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These critiques of the private prison condemnation arguably fit the
American correctional market better than its Israeli and Australian
equivalents. Admittedly, the share of private prison companies in
owning and running prisons is much smaller than the popular
literature suggests. But to focus on this small percentage is to ignore a
vast spectrum of privatized, for-profit incarceration services that have
been privatized in public prisons. It is probably more sensible to
perceive privatization not as an either/or option, but rather as a
continuum of private-sphere involvement in the provision of
correctional services.121Of course, private prison industries, some of
them within walls, are commonplace in public prisons as well as in
private ones, and benefit extensively from the competitiveness of
prison labor.122But many other services within prisons, from food123
to rehabilitative programs,124 have been privatized. The examples that
follow illustrate the extent to which private services have permeated
public institutions.
Perhaps the phenomenon that has received the most negative attention
recently is the privatization of health services. 125 While prisons have
never excelled at providing health care to inmates, after the Attica
revolt provision of health care to inmates came to be viewed as an
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Eighth Amendment right.126 However, since then, the overall
neoliberal perspective on the role of the state has changed
dramatically, and its retreat from welfare responsibility on the outside
is clear on the inside as well. This has included a transformation in the
perception of the inmate, from ward of the state to a consumer of
services.127 As an outcome, public and private prisons have narrowed
their healthcare offerings to “bare life” sustenance.128 One effect of
the privatization of prison health care has been muddled
accountability for medical negligence, and as Wil Hylton has noted,
many practitioners working for private companies reportedly have
had their licenses revoked in other states.129 Hylton’s investigation of
the prison’s approach to hepatitis revealed a strong motivation to save
money at the expense of providing inmates with hepatitis treatment,130
which led to noncompliance with the Centers for Disease Control’s
protocols for treating the epidemic.131 Private health care providers
fiercely fight journalists who expose instances of medical neglect in
prisons.132 Paul von Zielbauer’s journalistic investigation into Prison
Health Services, a private prison provider, exposes the problematic
nature of private health care in local jails.133 Zielbauer recounts
horrifying examples of neglectful healthcare, which show that the
hope of efficient care is shattered by scant and unqualified medical
staff and unpunished employee misconduct,134 prompting scathing
reports by the New York State Commission of Correction.135 It should
probably be noted that inmates, who tend to be in worse health than
126
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the general population and more dependent on alcohol and drugs, are
particularly vulnerable to faulty medical care.136
One recent example of medical misconduct occurred when Nicole
Guerrero, a pregnant inmate in a public prison in Wichita County,
Texas, called for help when her water broke in solitary confinement.
A nurse working with a private prison provider, who was later found
to have had an expired license, did not heed Guerrero’s plea for
medical assistance, and the baby died shortly after its birth. Guerrero
is suing the nurse and Correctional Healthcare Management, the
private firm, for medical malpractice.137
Another industry that has been the subject of abundant criticism is the
phone company. This is a particularly important issue given how
essential telephone services are to inmates for staying in contact with
their families, and to the system overall given the importance of
family contact and visitation and its proven impact of recidivism
reduction.138 Supportive families of inmates cite the difficulties of
visitation and telephone calls as a hindrance and hardship, financially
and emotionally.139 Given these issues, and particularly the logistical
136
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and financial difficulties in visitations, especially in remotely located
prisons,140 it should be a priority for public and private prisons alike
to make phone calls accessible. Nonetheless, there have been multiple
litigation efforts surrounding the excessive fares charged by private
phone companies contracting with public prisons, as well as efforts to
regulate such fares.141
A less visible private function is that of transporation companies,
which are a private business that serves public and private prisons.142
The biggest private transportation service is Transcor, which is owned
by CCA.143 These transportation services have yielded several serious
problems, including dangerous driving,144 improper security leading
to escapes,145 and even inmates being burned alive in a defective
bus.146 Also notable are more than a few instances of sexual and
physical assault of inmates in the hands of private transportation
employees.147
While public prison guards lobby hard to differentiate themselves
from private corporate correction employees, there is an increasing
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market for training of public prison guards, including riot
preparation,148 with the addition of tourist attractions and exhibit
halls.149 These, in part, support industries of weapons designed to
quell riots and ease arrests, such as tasers.150
The conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that the public
perception of the prison industrial complex is both too grim and too
rosy. Contrary to some of the PIC critical literature, the share of fully
private institutions in the market is narrow, their impact on
policymaking considerably smaller than perceived, and their
contribution to mass incarceration, while not negligible, fails to
explain the growth of the U.S. prison population or its oppression in
any meaningful way. However, expanding one’s perspective beyond
the particular companies that run entire institutions exposes a
spectrum of privatized operations in public prisons that are also
driven by profit motivations. Therefore, any ethical or utilitarian
ailment that can be leveled against private prison companies can also
be leveled against public institutions, which are increasingly private
in name only. Moreover, accusing private companies of profiteering
from the prison crisis – which is true, but a convenient scapegoat – is
taking the heat off the real culprits: states, and particularly state
prosecutors, who are the ones driving the prison crisis in the first
place with untoward punitive charging policies.151
But even this critique does not fully address the scope of the problem.
The distinction between the public and private sector is not only futile
because of the increased privatization within public institutions, but
also because it assumes that private actors are motivated by different
incentives than public ones. The next chapter relies on public choice
insights to argue that, in fact, public actors consider cost/benefit
factors just as frequently as private ones, both as individuals and on
the institutional level. And as the incarceration shifts following the
148

Jennifer Gonnerman, “The Riot Academy: Guards Stage Mock Prison Riots to
Test the Latest High-Tech Gear,” in Herivel and Wright, Prison Profiteers, 228234.
149

Ibid., 231.

150

Anne-Marie Cusac, “Shocked and Stunned: The Growing Use of Tasers,” in
Herivel and Wright, Prison Profiteers, 250-264.
151

Pfaff, “Macro and Micro Reasons.”

33

Great Recession of 2008 have revealed, private and public actors are
negotiating, wheeling and dealing in remarkably similar ways, in
mutual response to market pressures to decrease incarceration.
III. PUBLIC ACTORS AS MARKET PLAYERS
A. Public Incarceration Conditions and the Ugly Pig Contest
In a symposium titled Capitalism, Government, and the Good Society,
political scientist and former North Carolina libertarian gubernatorial
candidate Michael Munger used a unique simile to explain the choice
between the state and private actors:
In North Carolina at the state fair, we have what in effect are
beauty contests for pigs. So you might imagine in one of the
categories at the state fair there is a Big Pretty Pig contest. And
there aren’t many entrants because there’s big pigs, and there’s
pretty pigs, but there’s not many big pretty pigs. So there’s just
two; we have the two entrants. The first one comes out and the
judge goes, ‘Oh, God, that’s an ugly pig! Let’s give the prize to
the second one.’ Well, he hasn’t seen the second pig. Now it’s
true that the first pig is ugly. But why would you have a decision
based on the fact that there’s problems with one system, the other
one must be better? But that’s precisely what people who want to
reject market solutions in some ways are advocating. So the
world is imperfect, our knowledge is limited, that particular pig of
market solutions is in many ways pretty ugly. The world is hard.
The problem is that advocates of state intervention often want to
award the prize to the invisible pig: the state. But when you
actually take a look under bright lights, government failures are
just as ugly, just as prevalent, and in some ways harder to control
than market failures.152
The comparison is hardly offensive, and possibly euphemistic, when
used to examine incarceration conditions. The serious critiques
leveled at private prison conditions are, of course, justified. Some
recent incidents include the disturbing audit conducted in October
2012 at the CCA-owned Ohio Correctional facility, which found 47
152
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violations of state prison standards,153 most related to severe
overcrowding of low-risk offenders under the supervision of
inexperienced guards.154 Similarly, Otter Creek Correctional Center in
Wheelwright, Kentucky, had its state funding pulled in August of
2012 after Hawaii removed all 168 female inmates it had housed at
the facility due to allegations of sexual abuse by prison guards.155 In
another egregious instance of private prisons run amok, GEO
removed its presence entirely from Mississippi in April 2012, after
Federal Judge Carlton Reeves wrote that GEO-run Walnut Grove
Youth Correctional Facility had “allowed a cesspool of
unconstitutional and inhuman acts and conditions to germinate, the
sum of which places the offenders at substantial and ongoing risk,”
including routine sex between staff and underage inmates, “poorlytrained guards brutally beat youth and used excessive pepper spray,”
and prison guards turned a blind eye to inmates possessing homemade
knives that were used in “gang fights and inmate rapes.”156
But is this decidedly-very-ugly-pig that much uglier than its public
counterpart? Here are only three examples from a state that holds all
of its in-state inmates in public facilities.157 In 2011, the Supreme
Court decided what might be the biggest inmate human rights case of
153
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our time, Brown v. Plata.158The case exposed the abysmal quality of
physical and mental healthcare provided in public California prisons.
Justice Kennedy, writing the Opinion of the Court on behalf of five
Justices, detailed numerous horrific instances of systemic
indifference, resulting in inmates sitting in their own human waste for
hours, injuries and chronic conditions becoming worse and worse
through medical neglect and maltreatment, and unnecessary,
iatrogenic deaths at a rate of an inmate every six days.159 It is
particularly poignant that these practices were so horrifying that,
years before the decision, the courts had taken the prison health care
system out of the hands of the state and placed them in the hands of a
federal receiver160—but even that was not enough.161 Justice Kennedy
grimly concludes:
To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide
for their own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State for food,
clothing, and necessary medical care. A prison's failure to provide
sustenance for inmates 'may actually produce physical 'torture or a
lingering death'.'. . . Just as a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or
she may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care. A
prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including
adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human
dignity and has no place in civilized society. . . [i]f the
government fails to fulfill this obligation, the courts have a
responsibility to remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment
violation.162
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Federal courts are currently in the process of hearing another lawsuit,
Ashker v. Brown,163 which addresses the practice of solitary
confinement in California. In 2011 and 2013, inmates in California’s
Pelican Bay and Corcoran institutions, as well as in other public
correctional facilities, engaged in hunger strikes to protest against the
conditions in the Security Housing Unit (SHU).164 These conditions
included placement in small solitary cells for 23 hours a day with no
human contact for an indefinite period of time—sometimes lasting
decades165—not for disciplinary violations, but for a suspicion of
gang membership.166 The hunger strike ended only when Judge
Thelton Henderson ordered that the inmates be force-fed.167
In 2013, an exposé by the Center for Investigative Reporting
uncovered a scandal of massive proportions: the sterilization of
female inmates without proper state procedures. A subsequent 2014
California Auditor examination uncovered 144 cases of tubal ligations
performed in inmates between 2006 and 2010, 39 of which were
performed without consent and a further 27 in which the inmates’
physicians did not sign the appropriate forms. Interviews with the
inmates that had undergone the procedure reveal disturbing degrees of
paternalism and pressure on the part of medical staff.168 “As soon as
[the institution’s OB-GYN] found out that I had five kids”, recounted
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an inmate to the Sacramento Bee, “he suggested that I look into
getting it done. The closer I got to my due date, the more he talked
about it. . . He made me feel like a bad mother if I didn't do it."
Many more examples of cruelty, laziness and neglect in public prisons
lead to the inevitable conclusion: incarceration conditions in the
United States may differ across states and different types of
institutions, but it is difficult to argue that private institutions,
categorically, are worse than public ones. Both pigs are ugly. And as
the next chapter shows, criminal justice actors in the public sector are
not at all immune from profit motivations when they engage in
unconscionable behavior toward the people subjected to their control.
B. Profit-Seeking Aberrations and the Banality of Evil
In 2008, many conscientious Americans were shocked to discover
that two Philadelphia judges—Mark Ciavarella, the former President
Judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Please, and Michael
Conahan, a Senior Judge in the same county—were indicted and
convicting for accepting money from a private juvenile facility
provider, Robert Mericle, in return for sentencing thousands of
juvenile defendants harshly so they would be sent to the detention
centers.169 Mericle, a real-estate developer, was a staunch supporter of
Ciavarella’s election campaign;170 Conahan struck a personal
friendship with some organized crime leaders in Northeast
Pennsylvania.171
The defendants’ association with Mericle started with their support,
for cash of his juvenile facility venture in 2000-2001172, and
continued with their furnishing Mericle’s facilities with revenueraising bodies. Examples of their harsh sentencing for kickback
included seven weeks’ detention for a thirteen-year-old’s minor
violent incidents with his mother’s much-larger boyfriend,173 months
169
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of house arrest for an epileptic fourteen-year-old girl accused of
defacing stop signs with the inscription “vote for Michael Jackson”,174
a sixteen-year-old charged with “terroristic threats” for a prank and
sentenced to an indefinite term at a wilderness camp for girls,175 and a
fifteen-year-old who carelessly and mistakenly purchased a stolen
motorbike sent to a term at a “boot camp” which led him to use drugs
and exhibit signs of anxiety and depression, which brought him in and
out of detention facilities for three years.176 The Juvenile Law center
found that hundreds of defendants were tried without receiving proper
counsel.
Clearly, a serious culprit in this scandal is Robert Mericle, the
juvenile facility provider, who paid the judges in kickbacks, and one
possible reading of this story is as an indictment against such
institutions. But in an environment in which public officials are not
greedy, corrupt, and profit-seeking, a for-profit attempt to corrupt
judges would not result in such horrific results. William Ecenbager
provides background that includes a lengthy history of political
corruption,177 the judicial election system in 39 states including
Pennsylvania,178 and the “tough love” change in the American
approach to juvenile justice.179 In his account of the scandal,
Ecenbager shows that pressures were exerted by the judges over the
entire juvenile system in Pennsylvania, bullying lawyers and
therapeutic personnel to collaborate with their schemes, sometimes
openly stating that these policies were necessary because there were
“bills to pay.”180
Scandalous human rights crimes perpetrated for profit do not even
require the partnership of a private actor; sometimes, a legislative
lacuna suffices. A 1939 Alabama law allowed the state’s 67 sheriffs
to pocket any leftover money they managed to save from the state’s
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allowance for feeding inmates in local institutions. In 2009, thensheriff of Morgan County, Greg Bartlett, was charged and convicted
for having pocketed $212,000 from the prison’s food budget, while
the inmates were provided with inadequate food on $1.75 a day.181
His defense attorney argued that “everything he [had] done [was] by
the rules, including the feeding allowance.”182 After Bartlett’s release
from jail, he agreed to spend the food money solely on food and not
keep any funds for his personal use.183 Currently, Sheriff Mike
Rainey, who is calling on the legislature to end the current system and
allow county commissions to oversee the funds, has reportedly been
donating most of his potential earnings, to the tune of $10,000, to
charity.184
One would hope that Rainey’s public stance be the norm, rather than
notable and unusual honesty, and that Bartlett’s deeds be exposed for
the travesty they are, but Bartlett was defended in his trial by the
Alabama Sheriffs Association, who stressed in their defense that he
had not broken any laws—just exploited an existing system.185 And
when local advocacy groups sought to find out how common this
profiteering-on-food scheme was, the Director of the Alabama
Sheriffs Association sent each sheriff a letter advising them to ignore
the open records law.”186 Geraghty and Velez provide other examples
181
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of such enrichment: In South Georgia, Clinch County court officials
had charged state court misdemeanants $10-15 illegal fees, which
were pocketed by court personnel.187 Interpreting these incidents as
endemic to the Southern system does not obscure the fact that they
consisted of exploiting an opaque system riddled with antiquated law
to obtain personal profit.
Lest it seem that these are extreme, idiosyncratic examples of cruelty
and corruption, let us turn to much more ordinary profit-seeking
mechanisms of exploitation. On May 15, 2014, the California
legislature approved AB 1876, a bill designed to put an end to a
prevailing practice among county correctional officers to profiteer
from contracts with phone companies. The new bill “prohibits a
contract to provide telephone services to any person detained or
sentenced to a jail or juvenile facility from including any commission
or other payment to the entity operating the jail or juvenile
facility.”188
The bill was designed to address a county loophole in phone contract
regulation in local facilities. In 2007, California passed a law phasing
in reductions in the cost of prison phone calls, but left the county jail
market open to abuse and exploitation.189 So, in Contra Costa County,
phone call rates were triple what the state had put in place for stateowned facilities, and the commissions paid by the operator to the
county were 53 percent. The money was reportedly directed to an
“inmate welfare” fund, some of which was used for worthwhile
programming, but as commented in the Contra Costa Times,
obtaining it via a profit-seeking kickback was absurdly corrupt
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management.190 Similarly, the 2007 law pertaining to state prisons did
not cover interstate-calling costs, making those prohibitively
expensive and contact with out-of-state family virtually impossible
for low-income families.191 Similar schemes that make phone calls
prohibitively expensive, for prison authority profit, are being
protested in Virginia192 and Washington.
These individuals and institutions were clearly operating with the
intention to profit from their misdeeds. That they were public
officials, or public institutions, did not make them immune to greed or
more sensitive to human suffering than their private counterparts.
Indeed, much more mundane examples of wheeling and dealing
demonstrate that, when public and private actors are faced with a shift
in the profitability or sustainability of incarceration, they transform
their behavior and adapt to the changing market conditions in
surprisingly similar ways.
This phenomenon can be illustrated by examining the changes in
incarceration policies and practices following the Great Recession of
2008.193 When incarceration became less sustainable and states began
to feel the pressure to reduce their prison populations, private prison
companies offered their public clients “discounts” on the required
occupancy rates in their institutions,194 while at the same time
“diversifying their incarceration portfolio” by entering the
undocumented immigrant detention market and advocating for antiimmigration legislation.195 Responding to the same pressures, states
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recurred to prison closures.196 States who managed to reduce their
population tried to sell their unused correctional space to other
states.197States made decisions about housing inmates in-state, or outof-state, based on cost-benefit considerations.198
Public and private actors alike, we can conclude, negotiate with each
other, and with other actors, in order to respond to economic pressure.
Private prison companies are changing their contracts with state and
local governments to account for lesser occupancy, and states buy and
sell prison space from each other. Not only are these two “pigs” so
ugly that they defy comparison, they are both motivated by profit and
cost-benefit analysis, like the neoliberal subjects they are.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s journey into the inner workings of private and public
correctional agencies leads to the inescapable conclusion that PIC
critics who focus on private prison companies are missing the mark.
By focusing specifically on private incarceration, they reinforce the
traditional public/private divide, ignoring the realities of a fragmented
market as well as a fragmented state. Public institutions have
privatized so many of their internal functions that they can hardly be
differentiated from private ones. Public actors behave in ways as
atrocious and neglectful, and they respond to the same market
pressure, as their private counterparts.
A sober public choice perspective on incarceration (albeit one that
does not necessarily subscribe to the political preferences of public
choice) requires that critical prison literature abandon fantasy and
196
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acknowledge reality: fighting private incarceration companies, in
themselves, is not only futile, but also misses the mark. The problem
is not the institutions themselves, but rather the fact that they cannot
escape the neoliberal economy in which context they operate.
Calling attention to the horrifying, inhumane consequences of these
market pressures is important, but so is designing solutions that might
work. Since the capitalist makeup of the state, and its contribution to
the PIC, cannot be dismantled by raising consciousness to
humanitarian concerns, the regulation correctional behavior must be
altered so that it provides incentives to improve prison conditions.
One such alteration might be shifting the compensation basis for all
correctional institutions—private and public alike—from a per-diem
basis to a recidivism-reduction basis. In other words, inmate
recidivism will be measured for each correctional institution,
regardless of its management, and these institutions will be
compensated and budgeted according to their accomplishments in
recidivism reduction. Such a system would prompt prison
administrations to adopt rehabilitation programs proven to work and
to seek reentry schemes for their inmates that will improve their lives
overall and reduce the chance that they will return to prison. It will
also sever the link between better business and a larger number of
inmates, and eliminate the incentive for lobbying for “tough on
crime” propositions by public and private actors alike.
In crafting this system, care must be taken to avoid a situation in
which unsuccessful prisons simply close and all inmates are shuttled
to successful prisons, making the latter, over time, overcrowded and
unsuccessful. This incentive structure must be accompanied by a plan
to heal troubled prisons, which should include resources for
implementing proven vocational and educational training programs.
Everyone should be offered an opportunity to succeed in recidivism
reduction. Care must also be taken to foresee efforts to “game” the
new system by admitting solely inmates who have better rehabilitative
chances, by requiring that facilities accept inmates in their relevant
security level on a random allocation basis.
If, in light of such alterations in the compensation scheme, private
prison companies decide that their business is no longer profitable,
their exit from the field will not be mourned. But if, indeed, private
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entrepreneurs respond better to financial initiatives than to
accusations and limitations, let’s push everyone in the correctional
business, whether they wear badges or business suits, to do well by
doing good.
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